Site Stakeholder Group

Zoom Meeting of the
Hinkley Point Site Stakeholder Group

Friday 25 June commencing at 0930 hours

Additional paper work for this and previous meetings can be found on the website:
https://magnoxsocioeconomic.com/ssg.php?site=hinkley-point-a

Please confirm your attendance to this Zoom Meeting

AGENDA

1.	09.30	Welcome from the Chair
2.	09:35	Changes to membership and apologies for absence
3.	09.40	Open public Q&A session - maximum 20 minutes
4.	10.00	Minutes of the Meeting held 26 February 2021 • Accuracy • Matters arising – see separate sheet
5.	10.05	Station Director's report - Hinkley Point B Station, Peter Evans
6.	10.20	Hinkley Point B - Defuelling plans - Mike Davies, HPB's Lifetime Transition Manager
7.	10.35	Site Director's report – Hinkley Point A Site, Laura Miles
8.	10.50	Update from the NDA, Jonathan Jenkin
9.	11.05	Integrated Waste Management Programme – Claire Gallery-Strong
10.	11.15	Environment Agency Report Hinkey B, Victoria Thomas
11.	11.25	Environment Agency Report Hinkley A, Tracy Braithwaite
12.	11.35	Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) report Hinkley B, Darren Knowles
13.	11.45	Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) report Hinkley A, Simon Morgan
14.	11.55	Membership Review
15.	12.10	Chairman's report
16.	12.20	Any other business

The next meeting will be held on Friday 29 October 2021

HINKLEY POINT SITE STAKEHOLDER GROUP

SUMMARY OF KEY POINTS ARISING AT THE MEETING HELD VIA ZOOM ON FRIDAY 26 FEBRUARY 2021

- Mr Peter Evans, Hinkley Point B Station Director, reported on the station's continued high level of safety performance. He outlined the measures taken at the station to reduce the spread off coronavirus. Mr Evans referred to EDF's announcement that electricity generation at Hinkley Point B would come to an end by 15 July 2022 at the latest. It was planned that there should be two further periods of six months' operation of each reactor with outages in between these periods for graphite inspections. It was hoped that the Office for Nuclear Regulation's consent for returning the reactors to service would be received during the coming month.

- During the current outage of both reactors, it had been decided to refurbish a back-up feed system tank to modern construction standards. These tanks would be needed during operation and for a period following shutdown.

- Mr Evans reported on the failure of a joint in a control rod in a maintenance facility after it had been removed from the reactor. Investigations and inspections of other control roads had been undertaken in order to demonstrate that this problem did not affect other control rods and a safety case had been made supporting return to service.

- Mr Peter Montague, Hinkley Point A Site Closure Director reported on activities at the Site. He described actions taken to prevent the spread of coronavirus and pointed out that there had been no incidents or accidents on the Site. He described progress with the major programme of work to remove and despatch from site safely insulation materials potentially contaminated with asbestos.

- Mr Montague pointed out that monitoring of a large number of filters previously used in the liquid effluent plant had enabled these waste items to be classified as low level waste, thereby reducing the volume of intermediate level waste to be stored in the Site's interim storage facility.

- Mr Montague reported that factory acceptance tests had been completed on two items of plant designed for use at the A Site. One of these plants would process radioactive waste sludges, sand and resins and the other would compact steel drums containing wastes to reduce their volume.

- Members received reports from the NDA and from inspectors representing the Environment Agency and the Office for Nuclear Regulation. They also received a presentation from Prof Scott of Bristol University on fusion power and potential investment in a project to establish a technology park and a fusion power plant.

HINKLEY POINT SITE STAKEHOLDER GROUP

Minutes of the meeting held via Zoom
on Friday 26 February 2021

PRESENT

Cllr M Caswell (Chairman)	-	Sedgemoor District Council
Mr P Montague	-	Site Director, Hinkley Point A
Mr P Evans	-	Station Director, Hinkley Point B

Elected Members

Mr A Debenham	-	Stop Hinkley
Cllr Ms A Bown	-	Sedgemoor District Council
Cllr H Davies	-	Somerset West and Taunton Council
Cllr B Eyley	-	Kilve Parish Council
Mr A Jeffery	-	Bridgwater & W Somerset Green Party
Cllr C Morgan	-	Somerset West and Taunton Council
Cllr M Phillips	-	Cannington Parish Council
Cllr E Plomgren	-	Holford Parish Council
Cllr L Redman	-	Bridgwater Town Council
Cllr Ms A Reed	-	Wembdon Parish Council
Cllr M Reid	-	Nether Stowey Parish Council
Ms M Smith	-	Forum 21
Cllr Ms L Whetlor	-	Somerset West and Taunton Council

Co-opted Members

Mr M Brown (Vice Chairman)

Appointed Members

Mr J Jenkin	-	Nuclear Decommissioning Authority
Mr J McNamara	-	Nuclear Decommissioning Authority
Ms N Barnes	-	Office for Nuclear Regulation
Mr D Knowles	-	Office for Nuclear Regulation
Ms T Braithwaite	-	Environment Agency
Ms V Thomas	-	Environment Agency
Mr D Bamsey	-	Sedgemoor District Council
Mr R Davies	-	Somerset County Council
Ms L Martin	-	Somerset County Council
Mr J Burton	-	Somerset West and Taunton Council

EDF Energy

Mr D Stokes
Ms V Evans
Mr M Pardo
Mr D Uminski
Mr D Hanmer

Magnox
Ms J Callander
Ms G Coombs
Mr O Yapp

IN ATTENDANCE

Prof T Smith	-	Bristol University
Mr J Townes	-	Bristol University
Corrinne Matthews	-	Heart of the South West LEP
Mr R Birkenhead		
Mr M J Davis	-	Secretary

CHANGES TO MEMBERSHIP AND APOLOGIES FOR ABSENCE

1 Cllr Caswell welcomed all those present to this meeting of the Site Stakeholder Group for Hinkley Point A Site and Hinkley Point B Power Station. There were no changes in membership.

2 Apologies for absence were received from Mr M Short, Cllr Ms R Perrett Mr I Liddell-Grainger MP and Mr J Mason.

3 It was noted that there were sufficient members present to constitute a quorum for this meeting.

4 Mr Brown referred to a meeting with Chairs and Vice Chairs of the other SSGs which had been held virtually on the day prior to this meeting. He referred to discussions on an NDA initiative designed to develop an integrated waste management approach. He suggested and it was agreed that a presentation on this should be provided for members at the next meeting of this Group.

MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETINGS

(a) Accuracy

5 The minutes of the meeting of this Group held via Zoom on 23 October were approved as a correct record.

(b) Matters Arising

6 There were no matters arising from the minutes which would not be covered in presentations later in the meeting.

STATION DIRECTOR'S REPORT – HINKLEY POINT B

7 Mr Evans reported on activities and performance at the power station since the previous meeting of this Group, drawing particular attention to the following:

(i) There had been a fatal road traffic accident recently in which a contractor's employee had been hit by a vehicle. Action was being taken to raise awareness of the dangers of speed when driving on local roads.

(ii) High standards of safety performance had been maintained at the station.

(iii) The Environment Agency had issued a warning letter in relation to the circumstances of the despatch of a consignment of desiccant referred to at the previous meeting. The circumstances of the event had been subjected to an independent review and issues had been addressed before a subsequent consignment had been processed.

(iv) Actions taken in response to the coronavirus pandemic now included the testing of all personnel on the site. Thermal imaging checked temperatures of all personnel on arrival.

(v) It had been announced that electricity generation on the B Station site would come to an end on 15 July 2022 at the latest. It was proposed that each of the reactors would operate for two further periods of six months with outages for graphite inspections between each of those two periods. It was hoped that consent for reactor start-up would be given by the ONR during the coming month; extensive commissioning checks were being undertaken and staff were undergoing training including use of the reactor simulator by operators.

(vi) During the outage of both reactors inspections had been undertaken on the backup feed system storage tanks. It had been found that some of the construction was not consistent with modern standards and a decision had been taken to overhaul the tanks. In addition to the role of these tanks during future operation, they would be required to be available for reactor cooling post shutdown.

(vii) In December, during checks of a control rod removed from the reactor, an articulated joint had failed, and the bottom segment of the control rod had fallen into the storage tube within the maintenance facility. Investigations had shown that the failure had been due to the fact that the material used in making this joint had not been as specified in the design. Further inspections had been carried out, including the examination of video records of control rods previously removed for maintenance, in order to demonstrate that this problem affected only this particular joint. A safety case had been produced to support return to service.

(viii) There were currently 504 full-time EDF personnel at the station.

(ix) An exercise of the station's emergency arrangements was to be undertaken on 16 September and a security exercise was to take place on 21 July. It was possible that the site siren would sound during these exercises.

(x) Staff and contract partners at the Station had raised over £13000 for Prostate Cancer UK, EDF's chosen charity.

8 In response to questions from Cllr Morgan and Cllr Eyley, Mr Evans said that the control rod joint which had failed was of a substantial design and generally these were found to be in very good condition. This particular one had failed during normal routine checks of the articulation. This had been the first such failure during the operational life of the station.

9 Cllr Ms Bown expressed her appreciation of the Station's charitable fund-raising efforts and of the measures taken to provide a safe working environment during the coronavirus pandemic.

10 In reply to a question from Mr Jeffery, Mr Evans said that the results of the planned reactor inspections between future periods of operation would be submitted to ONR for assessment in the usual way.

SITE DIRECTOR'S REPORT – HINKLEY POINT A SITE

11 Mr Montague reported on activities at the A Site since the previous meeting, drawing particular attention to the following:

(i) There had been no incidents or accidents at the Site since the previous meeting. It was now over 2 years since the last event involving time lost from work and almost 13 years since the last personal contamination event. The current focus was on safety of working at height and mental health issues; the next safety drive would be on attitudes during decommissioning, which needed to be vigilant and ready to find unexpected conditions.

(ii) Coronavirus measures included testing; there had been no positive test results recorded on the Site. Out of 850 tests undertaken in Magnox only two asymptomatic infections had been identified There was good compliance with social distancing measures on the Site.

(iii) As part of an NDA sustainability project, attention was focused upon reducing energy consumption, including street lighting and the use of fans, and improving biodiversity on the Site.

(iv) Some 68% of waste fine filters previously used in the liquid effluent plant had been monitored and found to be able to be classified as low level waste. This reduction in the inventory of waste would mean fewer ILW packages needed to be stored in the interim storage facility. It was hoped that retrievals of fuel element debris from the wet vault would be close to the target of 10 tonnes by the end of March.

(v) Good progress was being made with the major programme of asbestos removal, with asbestos containing materials removed being treated appropriately and some 62 tonnes of clean metal released for recycling.

(vi) Work within the sludge canning building had improved access for decommissioning work.

(vii) Analysis of samples of fuel element debris waste had been removed from the dry vault and characterised in order to determine waste packaging arrangements for these wastes.

(viii) Equipment which would process radioactive waste sludges, sands and resins had completed factory acceptance testing and would be installed on the Site. Factory acceptance testing had also been completed on a drum compactor which would achieve significant reduction in the volume of wastes packed in steel drums. This process would reduce the number of packages of these wastes to be stored in the storage facility.

(ix) Seven nuclear operative apprentices had been recruited and were making good progress on the Site.

12 In reply to a question from Cllr Plomgren, Mr Montague described arrangements for processing asbestos contaminated waste and the transfer of the waste to a licensed contractor for disposal. In response to the interest in the categorisation of these wastes expressed by Mr Jeffrey Mr Montague undertook to provide him with details of the criteria which determined these categorisations.

13 In response to questions from Cllr Davies, Mr Montague explained that the drum compaction equipment was designed to reduce the volume of the drums and hence reduce the number of packages containing these drums to be consigned to the storage facility. The concrete box package within which the compacted drums would be placed provided the containment of the waste materials. Mr Montague said that the company's proposal to receive at Hinkley Point waste materials despatched from other sites had not received the necessary planning consent. The company had not yet applied for a variation and was considering what further action might be taken.

UPDATE FROM THE NUCLEAR DECOMMISSIONING AUTHORITY

14 Mr Jenkin provided an update on current activities within the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, drawing particular attention to the following:

(i) NDA corporate staff continued to work largely from home unless access to office accommodation was essential.

(ii) Senior appointments made recently within NDA included Mr L Haynes as chairman of Dounreay, Mr M Rouse as managing director of Dounreay, Mr T Meggs as chairman of Sellafield Ltd and Mr M Walkingshaw as chairman designate of low level waste repository. A group leadership structure had been announced.

(iii) Consultations were complete on the NDA's draft Business Plan and the draft Strategy document, final drafts had been submitted for government approval and the approved documents would be published in late March.

(iv) Working groups had been established in Copeland and Allerdale to consider issues associated with the possible location of a geological disposal facility. This did not imply that the facility would inevitably be established in those areas; it was for other local areas to establish working groups if they wished to be considered as a potential host location.

15 In response to a comment made by Cllr Caswell, Mr Jenkins said that discussions were ongoing with EDF and the Department for Business Energy & Industrial Strategy in relation to arrangements for decommissioning of the AGR stations when they ceased generation. One option would be to pass responsibility for decommissioning those stations to the NDA but no conclusions had yet been reached in those discussions.

16 Mr Debenham asked about the size of the NDA budget and the financing of a geological disposal facility. Mr Jenkin said that for the coming year NDA's budget amounted to some £3.5 billion of which £2.7 billion was direct funding from government and £800 million represented income from commercial activities. Mr McNamara said that the costs of establishing a geological disposal facility would be large but that the investment in the project would provide considerable benefits to the local community hosting the facility. In response to a further question from Mr Jeffrey, Mr Jenkin said that EDF maintained a nuclear liabilities fund to cover the cost of decommissioning its stations; the NDA had an oversight role in relation to this fund on behalf of the Secretary of State.

ENVIRONMENT AGENCY REPORT

17 Ms Thomas and Ms Braithwaite reported on the Environment Agency's monitoring and regulatory activities in relation to Hinkley Point A Site and B

Station. A report on those activities had been circulated to members in advance of the meeting. Particular attention was drawn to the following:

(i) Hinkley Point B had responded very positively to the warning letter issued by EA in relation to breaches of permit conditions associated with a despatch of desiccant material during September. The breaches had minimal environmental impact but had a potential to cause harm. A second batch of this waste consigned during December had been in compliance with requirements. Miss Thomas felt it was unlikely that there would be another despatch of this material before decommissioning of the site.

(ii) Throughout the period of the pandemic regular contact was maintained with the sites and inspections were continuing, including some undertaken jointly with Office for Nuclear Regulation inspectors.

(iii) The Agency had requested an audit of processes following reported discrepancies between the analysis of samples from liquid effluent tanks undertaken on the A Site and those provided by a contracted laboratory.

(iv) An investigation was in hand at Hinkley Point A to examine the circumstances associated with drums containing low level waste which were found to be leaking.

OFFICE FOR NUCLEAR REGULATION REPORT

18 Mr Knowles and Ms Barnes reported on ONR's regulatory activities in relation to Hinkley Point B Station and A Site. Reports from the ONR on both sites had been circulated to members in advance of the meeting. Mr Knowles and Ms Barnes drew particular attention to the following:

(i) Interactions with site personnel and inspections were continuing throughout the pandemic; the results of all inspections had been positive. Inspectors were satisfied with the measures taken at the sites to reduce the spread of coronavirus.

(ii) The assessments of graphite safety cases, the control rod event, and the condition of the backup feed system tanks would all be taken into account by ONR in its decision relating to consent for re-starting the Hinkley B reactors. The target date for a decision on start-up was 15 March.

NUCLEAR FUSION REACTORS AND STEP

19 Prof Scott explained the process of nuclear fusion and its potential advantages over other energy sources. He outlined the government's proposed investment in this technology which was directed towards the development of a STEP

(Spherical Tokamak for Energy Production) facility which might be in service by 2040. He said that the first step was to establish a technology business park where the various new technologies required to support such a project could be developed. The technology park itself would be a major undertaking, occupying possibly 100 Ha. Consideration was being given to the potential for locating these projects in the Hinkley Point area.

20 Prof Scott said that proposals were currently being developed for the location of the technology park and STEP facility in various parts of the country. Expressions of interest were to be submitted to the UKAEA by 31 March. UKAEA would then carry out a selection process and make a recommendation to government on the location of the facility.

21 During discussion the following points were noted:

(i) Cllr Caswell asked that copies of the slides used by Prof Scott in his presentation should be made available to members.

(ii) Cllr Phillips asked what efficiency improvements were anticipated as he understood that earlier experimental fusion reactors had consumed more energy than they generated. Prof Scott said that the main improvements were in the means of achieving higher operating temperatures and in maintaining operating conditions for longer periods.

(iii) In response to comments from Mr Debenham, Prof Scott said that current fusion energy projects were demonstrating good progress in relation to planned costs and timescales. He said that some forms of energy production were required to meet intermittent gaps in the output of renewable sources.

(iv) Mr Jeffrey raised an objection to the inclusion of this topic on the meeting agenda; he felt that it was not appropriate business for this Group. Cllr Caswell said that in the past the Group had received presentations on various forms of alternative energy production. He felt it was appropriate for this Group to enable members to receive such information in an open and transparent way.

(v) Cllr Reid asked about the location of a potential site for these developments in this area. Mr Bamsey said that consideration was being given as to what sites might be available within appropriate timescales. These included the Hinkley Point site but other sites over a wider area were also being considered; similar processes were being undertaken in various other parts of the country.

CHAIRMAN'S REPORT

22 A report from Cllr Caswell as chairman of the Group had been circulated to members in advance of the meeting. Cllr Caswell drew attention to the changes in local government which were due to take place in the coming months. He said that it was not yet clear what form the new arrangements would take but it was clear that the membership of this Group would change. He proposed and it was agreed that Mr Brown should be asked to convene a sub-group after the May 2021 local government elections to consider and make recommendations in relation to the future membership of this Group.

OTHER URGENT BUSINESS

23 No business.

DATE TIME AND PLACE OF NEXT MEETIING

24 It was noted that the next meeting of this Group was scheduled to be held on Friday 25 June 2021.

MJD
2 March 2021

Matters arising from the February 2021 SSG Meeting

Min7 (vi)	Have the modifications to these Tanks been completed?
Min7 (vii)	Have there been any further issues with the control rods and has the safety case been approved
Min 11 (v)	When do you hope to have the Asbestos removal complete?
Min11 (vii)	Is there any change in the analysis of FED samples?
Min15	How are talks progressing on the situation regarding the decommissioning of AGR'S

Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR)
Site Report for
Hinkley Point B Power Station

Report for period 1 January to 31 March 2021

Foreword

This report is issued as part of ONR's commitment to make information about inspection and regulatory activities relating to the above site available to the public. Reports are distributed to members for the Site Stakeholder Group and are also available on the ONR website (http://www.onr.org.uk/llc/).

Site inspectors from ONR usually attend Site Stakeholder Group meetings where these reports are presented and will respond to any questions raised there. Any person wishing to enquire about matters covered by this report should contact ONR.

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1 INSPECTIONS

1.1 Dates of inspection

1. The ONR site inspector made inspections on the following dates during the report period:

   - 25 January to 5 February 2021 (SBI on Reactor Safety Systems – remote)
   - 23 February to 4 March 2021 (LC3, 7 and 13 – remote)
   - 8 to 9 March 2021 (pre start up inspection)

2. In addition, ONR specialist inspectors undertook inspections on the following dates during the quarter:

   - 25 January to 5 February 2021 (SBI on Reactor Safety Systems – Remote)

2 ROUTINE MATTERS

2.1 Inspections

3. Inspections are undertaken as part of the process for monitoring compliance with:

   - the conditions attached by ONR to the nuclear site licence granted under the Nuclear Installations Act 1965 (NIA65) (as amended);
   - the Energy Act 2013;
   - the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 (HSWA74); and
   - regulations made under HSWA74, for example the Ionising Radiations Regulations 2017 (IRR17) and the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 (MHSWR99).

4. The inspections entail monitoring licensee's actions on the site in relation to incidents, operations, maintenance, projects, modifications, safety case changes and any other matters that may affect safety. The licensee is required to make and implement adequate arrangements under the conditions attached to the licence in order to ensure legal compliance. Inspections seek to judge both the adequacy of these arrangements and their implementation.

5. In this period, routine inspections of Hinkley Point B covered the following:

<u>LC3: Control of Property Transactions</u>

6. The aim of this inspection was to confirm that property transactions are adequately controlled and that any part of the site that is let, or transferred, does not impact on nuclear safety.

7. I sampled EDF's LC3 arrangements and concluded that they were broadly aligned to the current ONR guidance. I carried out a walkdown of the site to identify any areas that may not be under EDF control. I concluded that all such areas were adequately covered by the LC3 arrangements.

8. I concluded that the site was broadly complaint with the requirements of LC3 sampled. I am satisfied that an IIS rating of green against LC3 is merited.

LC7 Incidents on Site

9. This inspection was carried out remotely. The aim of this inspection was to confirm that incidents on site are properly recorded, investigated, reported and that actions identified are completed in a timely manner to prevent a reoccurrence.

10. I concluded that the quality of investigations carried out was good. However, I was concerned that there are indications that the screening meeting may be screening out events that could benefit from further follow up and that pressure to reduce the number of actions from investigations could mean that opportunities to prevent a reoccurrence are missed. I will increase my oversight of the Apparent Cause Investigations (ACINs) and Condition Report (CR) screening for the next three months to determine whether this is an ongoing issue or a product of the small sample size. I will also sample the quality of Minor Apparent Cause Investigations (MACI), which did not form part of this inspection.

11. I concluded that the site was broadly complaint with the requirements of LC7 sampled, but that there are areas for improvement. I am satisfied that an IIS rating of green against LC7 is merited.

LC13 Nuclear Safety Committee

12. This inspection was carried out remotely. The aim of the inspection was to confirm that the nuclear safety committee receives suitable information and is able to provide clear advice on safety submissions made to it.

13. I sampled the last three sets of NSC minutes that were relevant to Hinkley Point B. I concluded that the NSC was provided with information on relevant incidents, safety performance as well as formal submissions for consideration and advice.

14. I concluded that the site was broadly compliant with the requirements of LC13 sampled, but that there are areas for improvement. In particular I would encourage the site to ensure that any advice given to the station by the NSC is clearly recorded in the minutes. I am satisfied that an IIS rating of green against LC13 is merited.

System Based Inspections (SBI)

15. In addition to our compliance inspections based on the conditions attached to the nuclear site licence, ONR inspectors also inspect operating reactors against safety related systems. Each site has a safety case that demonstrates how it operates safely. For advanced gas cooled reactors, each of approximately thirty key systems will be inspected against the claims made upon them by the safety case. The aim is to systematically inspect all the significant safety related systems within a five-year cycle. ONR believes that this will provide more robust assurances of the site's safe operation and how the safety case is being implemented. Each of these system based inspections considers the relevant licence conditions below:

    - Licence condition 10: Training
    - Licence condition 23: Operating rules
    - Licence condition 24: Operating instructions
    - Licence condition 27: Safety mechanisms
    - Licence condition 28: Examination, inspection, maintenance and testing
    - Licence condition 34 (if applicable): Leakage and escape of radioactive material and radioactive waste

16. In this period one system based inspection (SBI) was carried out.

SBI27 Reactor Safety Systems

17. The Reactor Safety Systems primarily monitors reactor or plant conditions and initiates a reactor trip should reference levels of measured parameters be exceeded. The majority of the inspection was carried out remotely with one site visit by a specialist inspector and the site inspector to carry out a plant walkdown.

18. The inspection covered LC10, 23, 24, 27 and 28 and no significant issues were identified.

19. From the evidence examined during this intervention, we judged that there were no matters that have a significant adverse impact on nuclear safety. We consider EDF NGL have adequately implemented their arrangements to ensure nuclear safety is maintained. There was no formal regulatory action raised from the outcomes of this intervention. We judge the overall inspection rating is green.

2.2 Other work

20. Because of the ongoing coronavirus pandemic risks during the reporting period visits to site remain reduced, although increased on the previous quarter. The site inspector continued to work remotely to monitor the performance of the site by:

    a. Maintaining the increased dialogue with site management and the licensee's independent nuclear safety assurance function to develop a consistent picture of the measures put in place to manage the safety of both the workforce and the plant.
    b. Observing the meetings and working groups the licensee established to assess the coronavirus pandemic and manage the response. This included the site pandemic working team meeting (which maintained and overview of the site's response) and maintenance requirements review group (which managed the impact of potential or actual staff and supply chain shortfalls on safety-significant maintenance activities).
    c. Monitoring the minimum staffing levels required to deliver an adequate response in the event of an accident or emergency on the site.

21. Consequently, the site inspector considers that the site has managed its response to the pandemic during the period in a manner that, so far as is reasonably practicable, protected its own staff and ensured that there was no degradation in nuclear safety.

22. During visits to site the site inspector observes the compliance with of the site with its Covid arrangements. No significant issues or trends have been identified during the visits.

23. During the period the site inspector carried out follow up visits with other inspectors.
    a. The first of these was to determine how Hinkley Point B had responded to the improvements in management of saturated steam systems following an event at Heysham 1. We concluded that adequate progress had been made on the site in addressing the issue, but we noted that the site had taken a different approach to other sites and had not fitted drain valves. We concluded that the safety requirements were still being met, but suggested the site review why it had taken a different approach from other sites.
    b. The second was to assess progress in addressing the actions in the enforcement letters issued following an excavator event on the licensed site in 2019. We concluded that both EDF and the contractor had made good progress in improving their industrial safety arrangements for the work. Both enforcement letters have now been closed out following the visit.

3 NON-ROUTINE MATTERS

24. Licensees are required to have arrangements to respond to non-routine matters and events. ONR inspectors judge the adequacy of the licensee's response, including actions taken to implement any necessary improvements. No non-routine matters of note occurred during the reporting period.

4 REGULATORY ACTIVITY

25. ONR may issue formal documents to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. Under nuclear site licence conditions, ONR issues regulatory documents, which either permit an activity or require some form of action to be taken; these are usually collectively termed 'Licence Instruments' (LIs), but can take other forms. In addition, inspectors may take a range of enforcement actions, to include issuing an Enforcement Notice.

26. On 12th March 2021, ONR wrote to EDF stating that following review and consideration ONR had no objection to the implementation of the Safety Case for the Core Restraints. The safety case justified the core restraint system is functionally intact up to a core burn up of 19.75 TWd.

4.1 Graphite Cores Safety Case

27. On 17th March 2021, ONR issued licence instrument 564 to EDF giving Agreement for the implementation of the Safety Case 'HPB R3 and R4 Graphite Cores – Post Keyway Root Cracking Safety Case'. The safety case justifies that the key safety requirements of the graphite core continue to be met during normal operation and fault conditions up to core burn up of 17.55 TWd for R3 and 17.3 TWd for R4.

28. It has long been understood that irradiation of the fuel channel graphite bricks would eventually lead to shrinkage and cracking of these bricks late in reactor lifetime. Such cracking is termed keyway root cracking. This cracking has the potential to affect key nuclear safety requirements and consequently it needs to be demonstrated that these requirements continue to be met in normal operation, fault conditions and after a design basis seismic event.

29. The case specifies the controls and compliance requirements that will need to be satisfied to support operation to those core-burn-up limits. These controls are based on core inspections after an appropriate period of operation, assessment of the inspection findings and ongoing core monitoring. This safety case builds upon the evidence from previous safety cases with:

    a. Damage tolerance assessments updated to reflect improved understanding of the effects of core degradation and results used to demonstrate that for further operation brick cracking does not impede control rod entry and
    b. Additional assessments to address the potential risk and consequences of fragments and debris for cooling of fuel in-situ and fuel movement.

30. ONR's review included specialists from Civil Engineering, External Hazards, Graphite and Fault Studies specialisms. ONR concluded that the operation of Hinkley Point B has been adequately justified by EDF NGL. Core inspections will take place after a period of between 5 and 7 months of operation the results of these inspections will be examined by ONR to ensure that they are within modelling presented by EDF NGL.

Table 1

Licence Instruments and Enforcement Notices Issued by ONR during this period

Date	Type	Ref No	Description
17/03/2021	Agreement	564	AGREEMENT TO NP/SC 7800 – HPB R3 AND R4 GRAPHITE CORES – POST KEYWAY ROOT CRACKING SAFETY CASE

Reports detailing regulatory decisions can be found on the ONR website at http://www.onr.org.uk/pars/.

5 NEWS FROM ONR

31. Below are summaries of key activities over the last three months. Further detail is available on our website.

5.1 Covid-19 (Coronavirus) (ONR position)

32. We are continuing to obtain assurance that nuclear site licensees and other dutyholders are adequately resourced to continue to safely and securely carry out their activities. We remain satisfied with industry's response at this time and there has been no significant change to dutyholders' safety and security resilience. As COVID-19 restrictions change, our focus is on the preparedness for the weeks and months ahead and maintaining safe and secure operations. Our latest position can be found on our website.

5.2 Enforcement Action

33. In January, we agreed to extend two Improvement Notices served on the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), recognising the good progress made so far. The Notices, which were served in June 2019, relate to the way the company controls changes to organisational structure and resources which may affect safety.

34. In January, we served an Improvement Notice on Sellafield Ltd following a number of electrical safety incidents across the site. While we are satisfied that Sellafield Ltd is currently meeting the high standards expected with regards to nuclear safety, as a regulator we require sustained improvements in the area of electrical safety.

35. In February, we served an Improvement Notice on Morgan Sindall Construction and Infrastructure Ltd after workers came close to striking a live high voltage electric cable during excavation work at the Sellafield site. Nobody was harmed in the incident on 7 October 2020, and there was no impact on the public or the environment. However, the incident posed a serious risk to workers who were operating within one metre of the 11kV cable.

5.3 Regulatory Updates

36. In March, we published a response on our website to a BBC report relating to Sellafield. We were naturally concerned to hear the claims, particularly any suggestion that staff have been subjected to racist abuse of any kind. As a regulator, if we had any concerns or evidence that bullying and harassment was impacting safety at the site, we would take robust action to ensure this is addressed as a matter of urgency.

37. In March, we published an article about how we responded to the serious nuclear accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant in 2011 to mark the 10th anniversary.

38. In March, we gave EDF permission for Reactors 3 and 4 at Hinkley Point B power station to return to service for a limited period of operation. Permission for Reactor 3 will allow it to operate to a core utilisation of 17.55 terawatt days, while permission for Reactor 4 is to

operate to a core utilisation of 17.3 terawatt days, which equates to two periods of approximately six months operation for each reactor.

5.4 Stakeholder Engagement

39. In February, we encouraged interested parties to take part in a Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) survey about building and maintaining trust between nuclear safety regulators and the stakeholders they engage with.
40. In February, we provided an update about the leadership structural changes we initially announced in December 2020. Under existing contractual arrangements, current Chief Executive Adriènne Kelbie CBE was always expected to step down as her extended term of office comes to an end in January 2022. Mark Foy will step into the new combined role on 1 June 2021, when the new leadership structure will come into full effect.
41. In February, we announced that we had appointed Donald Urquhart to the newly-created role of Executive Director of Operations, which will form part of our new leadership structure. As Executive Director of Operations, Donald will be responsible for leading our regulatory work.
42. In March, we announced that as part of our new leadership arrangements, we had appointed three new deputy chief nuclear inspectors (DCIs) to our regulatory and senior leadership teams: Jane Bowie, Paul Dicks and Steve Vinton, currently all senior superintending inspectors at ONR. All three new DCIs have a strong track record of delivering regulation across the organisation, and will help us maintain a focus on our Strategy 2020-25.

6 CONTACTS

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Published 10/20

Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR)
Quarterly Site Report for
Hinkley Point A

Report for period 1 Jan 2021 – 31 Mar 2021

Foreword

This report is issued as part of ONR's commitment to make information about inspection and regulatory activities relating to the above site available to the public. Reports are normally distributed quarterly to members for the Hinkley Point Site Stakeholder Group and are also available on the ONR website (http://www.onr.org.uk/llc/).

A site inspector from ONR usually attends Hinkley Point Site Stakeholder Group meetings and will respond to any questions raised there. Any person wishing to inquire about matters covered by this report should contact ONR.

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1 INSPECTIONS

1.1 Dates of inspection

ONR inspectors undertook inspections on the following dates during the quarter:

- 1-2 March 2021
- 9 March 2021

2 ROUTINE MATTERS

2.1 Inspections

Inspections are undertaken as part of the process for monitoring compliance with:

- The conditions attached by ONR to the nuclear site licence granted under the Nuclear Installations Act 1965 (NIA65);
- The Energy Act 2013;
- The Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 (HSWA74);
- Regulations made under HSWA74, for example the Ionising Radiations Regulations 2017 (IRR17) and the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 (MHSWR99); and
- Carriage of Dangerous Goods & Use of Transportable Pressure Equipment Regulations (CDG) 2009.

The inspections entail monitoring licensee's actions on the site in relation to incidents, operations, maintenance, projects, modifications, safety case changes and any other matters that may affect safety. The licensee is required to make and implement adequate arrangements under the conditions attached to the licence in order to ensure legal compliance. Inspections seek to judge both the adequacy of these arrangements and their implementation.

In this period, routine inspections covered the following legal requirements:

- LC 32 –Accumulation of radioactive waste;
- LC 33 –Disposal of radioactive waste;
- CDG 2009
- Regulation of Covid-19 Risk Control Measures

In general, ONR judged the arrangements made and implemented by the site in response to safety requirements to be adequate in the areas inspected. Where necessary, ONR will take formal enforcement action to ensure that appropriate remedial measures are implemented to reasonably practicable timescales.

2.1 Other work

ONR's site inspector held monthly tripartite telephone calls with the Licensee and the Environment Agency; these provide for the Licensee to update the regulatory bodies with progress on decommissioning programmes and other matters related to nuclear safety, security, or the environment. ONR's site inspector also held monthly telephone calls with the sites independent Environment, Health, Safety, Security & Quality (EHSSQ) inspector and safety representatives.

3 NON-ROUTINE MATTERS

Licensees are required to have arrangements to respond to non-routine matters and events. ONR inspectors judge the adequacy of the licensee's response, including actions taken to implement any necessary improvements.

In response to the Covid-19 pandemic all 12 of Magnox Ltd.'s licensed sites have put arrangements in place to ensure their workplaces are Covid-secure sites. The sites have returned to a new "normal" with majority of personnel combining working from home and at site as appropriate, with project work restarted to ensure the safe and timely decommissioning of these sites.

Emergency preparedness is being maintained through a duty cover team at each site in accordance with ONR approved emergency arrangements. These arrangements include the provision to call in additional personnel and the emergency services onto site to assist Magnox Ltd staff. These plans are rehearsed in line with the sites' planned emergency and contingency exercise programs.

4 REGULATORY ACTIVITY

ONR may issue formal documents to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. Under nuclear site licence conditions, ONR issues regulatory documents, which either permit an activity or require some form of action to be taken; these are usually collectively termed 'Licence Instruments' (LIs) but can take other forms. In addition, inspectors may issue Enforcement Notices to secure improvements to safety. In this period, no formal enforcement action was taken.

5 NEWS FROM ONR

Below are summaries of key activities over the last three months. Further detail is available on our website.

Covid-19 (Coronavirus) (ONR position)

- We are continuing to obtain assurance that nuclear site licensees and other dutyholders are adequately resourced to continue to safely and securely carry out their activities. We remain satisfied with industry's response at this time and there has been no significant change to dutyholders' safety and security resilience. As COVID-19 restrictions change, our focus is on the preparedness for the weeks and months ahead and maintaining safe and secure operations. Our latest position can be found on our website.

Enforcement Action

- In January, we agreed to extend two Improvement Notices served on the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), recognising the good progress made so far. The Notices, which were served in June 2019, relate to the way the company controls changes to organisational structure and resources which may affect safety.
- In January, we served an Improvement Notice on Sellafield Ltd following a number of electrical safety incidents across the site. While we are satisfied that Sellafield Ltd is currently meeting the high standards expected with regards to

nuclear safety, as a regulator we require sustained improvements in the area of electrical safety.

- In February, we served an Improvement Notice on Morgan Sindall Construction and Infrastructure Ltd after workers came close to striking a live high voltage electric cable during excavation work at the Sellafield site. Nobody was harmed in the incident on 7 October 2020, and there was no impact on the public or the environment. However, the incident posed a serious risk to workers who were operating within one metre of the 11kV cable.

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Stakeholder Engagement

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Chairman's Report for the June 2021 SSG

I was really hoping that this meeting would be held 'Face to Face' but unfortunately not. I am however convinced that, if everything goes to plan in July, our October meeting will be in person.

The Membership sub-group's meeting took place and some very positive proposals will be put to you. Some very difficult decisions were fully discussed in the light of uncertain times ahead with the Local Government proposals for Somerset. Our Vice Chair will present the report at our meeting. Can I thank all members of the Sub-Group for their work on this important issue.

Since the SSG meeting in February Pete Montague decided to leave and has been replaced temporarily by Laura Miles until mid July when Kirandeep Basra-Steele will take up the post. From a recent 'Teams' call I am convinced she will continue with the high standards of honesty, integrity and openness that we have all enjoyed previously. Mervyn and I had a meeting with Pete before he left to wish him all the very best and a sincere thank you from us all.

Unfortunately our 'B' site director, Peter Evans, has decided also to retire and this will be his last SSG. This again is very sad news; we, in this SSG, have been very fortunate in having Site Directors who have always been willing to share the 'up's and downs' of the stations and Peter has been no different. No doubt Peter will fill you in more in his report.

To return to membership. It was clear that the youth of today are not represented on our SSG. They see that Nuclear Decommissioning is a dead industry. As one member put it many years ago "Turkey's Praying for Christmas'. This is absolutely not the case and should be seen as a fantastic growth industry. We have apprentices on the sites and young people attending the Nuclear College just down the road in Cannington. We and the NDA must start to attract them to the industry; With 'B' site going into decommissioning in July next year, Hunterston "B" the same and perhaps Dungeness 'B'. We are in 2021 and remember that 'A' ceased generation in 2000!

Mike